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The Grand Valley Economic Index 

The Grand Valley Index of Economic 
Activity declined in January to 102.6 from 
its December, 1980, level of 102.9. This is 
a slight upturn from a low reached in 1980, 
when the index value was 100.6. The retail 
sales and nonresidential construction com­
ponents of the composite index exerted the 
greatest negative influence during 1980. 
The substantial oecline in the residential 
construction component of the index, 
which began in 1979, appears to have 
turned upward somewhat. There is also 
some evidence of an upturn in the use of 
industrial electric power. Employment also 
increased slightly at the end of 1980. In 
Muskegon County, both residential and 
nonresidential construction activity has 
declined significantly since 1978. 
The composite index is made up of a 
weighted average of five economic indi­
cators: bank debits, retail sales, residen­
tial and nonresidential construction, 
industrial power consumption, and em­
ployment. all of which are adjusted for 
seasonal variations and for the effects of 
inflation. 
An index has been prepared for the 
United States which makes use of approx­
imately the same components that make up 
the index for Kent, Ottawa, and Muskegon 
Counties. The movements of this index are 
shown by a broken line on the accom­
panying graph, which gives some evidence 
of how local economic activity comparee 
with national economic activity. 
Inquiries about the detailed facts of the 
index can be obtained by writing to Dr. 
Marvin DeVries, Dean, F. E. Seidman 
College. 
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The Grand Valley Economic Activity 
Index shows that the 1980 recession in the 
tri-county area ended as fast as it started, 
with a remarkably sharp bounceback. That 
pattern is quite similar to the national ex­
perience, but it occurred several months 
later. Now the regional economy appears 
to be in the same sluggish growth pattern 
as the national, which is still burdened by 
high inflation and high interest rates hold­
ing down certain components of demand, 
such as spending on durables and 
construction. 
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It now appears that we have made it 
through the end-of-the year scare, when 
interest rates hit record levels, without 
plunging us back into recession. Up to that 
time, economic activity was advancing 
smartly and credit demands were rising 
even more rapidly. Interest rates were ris­
ing sharply, to the point where there was 
concern that the recovery would be choked 
off in its infancy. There was concern that 
the Federal Reserve had tightened up hard 
on monetary policy and might be bearing 
down too hard on money and credit. At the 
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Atime, this was difficult to assess because 
Wthe Fed was holding back money-supply 
data because of problems with new types 
of deposits, shifting deposits, and finan­
cial-institution reporting arising out of the 
implementation of the Monetary Control 
Act. 
Now that the smoke has cleared, it is 
apparent that the Fed has indeed tightened 
up on money arid credit over the last few 
months. Total reserves and the monetary 
base were essentially constant from Octo­
ber through February. Since banks and 
other depository institutions must main­
tain reserves behind their checking-type 
deposits, zero growth in reserves makes it 
difficult, although not impossible, to 
achieve growth in money and credit. Thus, 
the most meaningful measures of the 
money supply show very slow growth dur­
ing the period. 
Since the beginning of 1981 the situa­
tion has eased, and short-term interest rates 
have receded substantiall y from their highs. 
This time around, however, the Fed seems 
determined, at least for the time being, not 
to repeat the mistakes of the past, when a 
_harp tightening was followed by signifi­
~ant and prolonged easing and all of the 
benefits of the tightening were lost. The 
monetary authorities have recently low­
ered their 1981 target growth rates for the 
money supply and seem determined not to 
let it grow too fast or let interest rates fall 
too rapidly. 
Toward the end of 1980, economic ac­
tivity on the national level was strong, and 
the real Gross National Product increased 
at a 4 percent annual rate in the fourth 
quarter. In real terms (after adjustment for 
inflation), personal consumption expendi­
tures, residential construction, and Federal 
government expenditures all strengthened 
in the fourth quarter. These increases eas­
ily offset the major new area of weakness­
real net exports of goods and services (ex­
ports over imports), which declined, re­
flecting the upturn in U. S. imports 
associated with our recovery along with a 
decline in U. S. exports as our international 
trading partners experience weakening ac­
tivities in their own economies. 
While real economic activity was up, so 
was inflation. Both the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) and the GNP price deflator 
hOW a worsening of inflation, but this 
•	 'ould reflect a rebound from the slowdown 
in mid-1980. It is small consolation to note 
that the inflation rate as measured by the 
CPI is less now than it was at this time last 
year, since the CPI overstated the actual 
inflation at that time. A good omen, possi­
bly, is that prices of producers' finished 
goods are rising more slowly than at any 
time in the last several years, with the 
exception of the 1980 recession period. It 
is far too early to say, however, that real 
progress is being or will be made against 
inflation. The underlying rate is still in the 
low "double-digits." 
The job situation has continued to im­
prove, but very slowly. The national un­
employment rate has fallen slightly from 
its recession high to about 7.3 percent. 
Civilian employment has finally climbed 
back up to its pre-recession level of almost 
98 million people, having gained back al­
most ail of the one million jobs lost in the 
recession. However, it should be noted that 
the 7 plus percent unemployment rate (and 
the capacity utilization ratio of 80 percent) 
greatly overstate the amount of "slack" in 
the economy. 
Much of the economic outlook, espe­
cially after mid-year, depends on the Fed­
eral Reserve's monetary policy and the 
new Administration's fiscal policy. Presi­
dent Reagan has put forth a new Federal 
budget which is unprecedented in recent 
decades in terms of expenditure and tax 
cuts, and in the general direction of the 
Federal government. But as large as the 
proposed expenditures cuts ($48.6 billion) 
and tax cuts ($40 billion) are, they do not 
really amount to very much more than 
reducing the Federal budget to where it 
would have been, based on projections of 
just a few years ago. 
The growth in Federal spending in re­
cent years has been far faster than had 
earlier been anticipated. For instance, from 
the second quarter of 1979 to the fourth 
quarter of 1980, Federal expenditures grew 
at an 18.8 percent annual rate while the 
Gross National Product grew only one-half 
as fast-9.8 percent. State and local gov­
ernment expenditures grew even less-9.3 
percent. In January, 1980, the 1981 Fed­
eral budget was planned at outlays of $616 
billion and receipts of $600 billion, with a 
deficit of almost $16 billion. The actual 
1981 budget, however, will have outlays of 
over $663 billion and receipts of approxi­
mately $607 billion, with a resulting defi­
cit of almost $60 billion! 
The 1982 budget that President Reagan 
inherited had planned outlays of $739 bil­
lion and receipts of $712 billion, with a 
planned deficit of $27 billion. Recent events 
indicate this too is too optimistic and that 
the 1982 deficit could be as high as $70 
billion. The size and growth of the Federal 
government are what the new President is 
trying to change. Aside from defense ex­
penditures, which have the largest dollar 
increases and are being increased for na­
tional defense reasons, the Federal budget 
is out of control. The other areas with very 
high expenditure increases are spending 
on transfer-payment programs and interest 
on a Federal debt which now approaches 
$1 trillion. 
The questions about the Federal budget 
revolve around how much of the program 
Congress adopts, how much gets modified 
in the legislative process, the timing of the 
proposed changes, and their impacts on the 
economy. At this time, it appears that the 
President will get most of what he is asking 
for in terms of budget reductions (from 
projected outlays). Reductions in tax rates 
are also virtually assured, but Congress 
will probably bias them more toward busi­
ness and less toward individuals than would 
the President. This reflects widespread 
skepticism about the "supply-side" effec­
tiveness of the President's program and the 
belief that the effects of the tax cuts will 
primarily be on demand. While these res­
ervations are well-founded, the Congress 
must not lose sight of the fact that massive 
tax increases are already programmed into 
the system because of "bracket creep," 
increased social security taxes, and the so­
called windfall-profits tax. These tax in­
creases themselves are the major reasons 
why Federal taxes were originally ex­
pected to increase by over $90 billion from 
fiscal year 1981 to fiscal year 1982. The 
Reagan proposal only reduces the planned 
tax increase by about half. 
Because of the likely timing and effects 
of the Federal tax and expenditure cuts, 
the promised course of monetary policy, 
and the other developments in the private 
sector such as weak household discretion­
ary income and the faltering leading indi­
cator index, the near-term outlook is for 
slow economic growth with continued high 
unemployment and inflation, and high but 
falling interest rates. This should continue 
until the latter half of 1981 when more 
solid economic growth can resume. 
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